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Altruistic punishment and altruistic compensation are important concepts that are
used to investigate altruism. However, altruistic punishment has been found to be
correlated with anger. We were interested whether altruistic punishment and
altruistic compensation are both driven by trait altruism and trait anger or
whether the inﬂuence of those two traits is more speciﬁc to one of the behavioral
options. We found that if the participants were able to apply altruistic
compensation and altruistic punishment together in one paradigm, trait anger
only predicts altruistic punishment and trait altruism only predicts altruistic
compensation. Interestingly, these relations are disguised in classical altruistic
punishment and altruistic compensation paradigms where participants can either
only punish or compensate. Hence altruistic punishment and altruistic
compensation paradigms should be merged together if one is interested in trait
altruism without the confounding inﬂuence of trait anger.
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Altruistic behavior has been deﬁned as a voluntary action intended to beneﬁt another
person without the expectation of receiving external rewards or avoiding externally
produced aversive stimuli or punishments (Eisenberg and Miller, 1987). However,
this broad motive deﬁnition of altruism has been further narrowed down in a
factor-analytical conceptualization (Carlo et al., 2003; Carlo and Randall, 2002)
where prosocial behavior has been categorized according to their driving motives
into six diﬀerent categories (see also Rodrigues et al., 2017 for validation in
German). Among these six categories was altruism, deﬁned by Carlo and Randall
(2002), seeing altruism or altruistic prosocial behavior as “voluntary helping moti-
vated primarily by concern for the needs and welfare of another, often induced by
sympathy responding and internalized norms/principles consistent with helping
others” (Carlo et al., 2010, p. 273). Also, as the helper is more concerned about
the need of the others, costs that may occur are included in the deﬁnition as well
(Carlo and Randall, 2002). Accordingly, we use altruism as deﬁned by Carlo and
Randall (2002) as a trait-construct that is motivationally based on the concern for
the needs and welfare of others and related to aﬀective reactions like empathy and
sympathy (Eisenberg et al., 2014). In context of economic decision making games,
behavioral altruism has been deﬁned in a similar way as costly action of beneﬁt to
another person (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). Some of the behavioral paradigms
that are used to assess altruistic behavior (see e.g. Fehr and G€achter, 2002) include
third party dictator games (Leliveld et al., 2012; Lotz et al., 2011b; Strobel et al.,
2011). In this variant the participants assume the role of an observer, watching inter-
actions or outcomes of interactions between a dictator and a responder in a dictator
game. The dictator divides a given amount of money between himself and the
responder. As usual in dictator games the responder cannot act and simply receives
the allotted amount. The observer on the other hand is endowed with his own ﬁxed
amount of money. Following the dictators allocation, the observers may act them-
selves. Their scope of actions varies from study to study. In studies investigating
altruistic punishment the observer has the opportunity to use his money to punish
the dictator i.e. decreasing the money of the proposer. Another version of the third
party dictator game gives the observers the chance to compensate i.e. increase the
money of the responder or choose between compensating the responder and punish-
ing the dictator (Leliveld et al., 2012).1.1. Altruistic punishment
A question arising in this context is whether altruistic punishment is actually altru-
istic by its nature. While punishment is a costly behavior it has no obvious direct
beneﬁts for another person. Based on the aforementioned deﬁnition this behavior
is not altruistic in a more narrow sense. However, it has been argued that altruisticon.2018.e00962
ors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
censes/by/4.0/).
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norms that increase cooperation (Fehr and G€achter, 2002). Additionally, it was
found recently, that people in dictator games are prone to show behavior that is
framed as morally right (Capraro and Rand, 2018; Tappin and Capraro, 2018), which
might also lead to altruistic punishment in third party economic games if altruistic
punishment is the only available behavioral option. Fehr and G€achter (2002) showed
that situations leading to altruistic punishment also evoke negative emotions like
anger and Jordan et al. (2016) showed, that altruistic punishment is related to sub-
jective ratings of state anger. Also, the oﬀender focused emotion rating of Lotz
and colleagues (2011b) showed a strong relation of anger towards the oﬀender
with altruistic punishment. Additionally, anger has been found to be a mediator of
altruistic punishment (Seip et al., 2009), being a better predictor to altruistic punish-
ment than perceived unfairness (Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996). The concept of
anger is deﬁned as “the response to interference with our pursuit of a goal we
care about. Anger can also be triggered by someone attempting to harm us (physi-
cally or psychologically) or someone we care about. In addition to removing the
obstacle or stopping the harm, anger often involves the wish to hurt the target”
(Ekman and Cordaro, 2011, p. 365). Acting out anger should also not be seen as
destructive and negative act per se, but this acting out of anger can also be used
in a constructive manner (Ekman and Cordaro, 2011), like punishing defectors in
dictator games to cause a possible change in their behavior in future trials
(Leliveld et al., 2012). But not only state anger might be relevant for altruistic pun-
ishment. Individual diﬀerences in the proneness to experience anger have been
investigated for a long time (e.g. Spielberger, 1988) and the construct of trait anger
has been found to be related to behavior like the approach of hostile situations
(Veenstra et al., 2017) and cyberbullying (Lonigro et al., 2015). As trait anger is
also linked to higher aggression (Veenstra et al., 2018), the link between trait anger
and acting out a punishment as an reaction to the norm violation may be given.
Further studies have identiﬁed and corroborated several correlates of altruistic pun-
ishment like guilt and anger (Nelissen and Zeelenberg, 2009) as well as altruism
(Strobel et al., 2011) and envy (Pedersen et al., 2013). Therefore diﬀerent kinds
of motives may be hidden behind third party punishment behavior, but anger plays
an important role to get the punishment going (Seip et al., 2009).1.2. Traits as capabilities to react to state manipulations
As the focus of research on this topic used to be on the state component of anger, we
tried to investigate trait anger and its inﬂuence on “altruistic” punishment. Using this
trait approach, one may be able to explain trait based variance in state based changes,
in order to come to a more precise prediction. For example, a person with low trait
anger scores could not get angry during a high state anger induction paradigm, while
a high trait anger person might react quicker and more easily to this anger inducingon.2018.e00962
ors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
censes/by/4.0/).
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sonality traits are known in many research ﬁelds, for example for physiological re-
actions like frontal asymmetry (see capability model, Coan et al., 2006). More
general, one can also consider the latent state-trait model (Steyer et al., 1999) as a
diﬀerent variant to include state and trait variance in order to explain the behavior.
Hence, we also wanted to investigate the trait eﬀects of anger on altruistic punish-
ment to achieve an estimation of possible systematic error variances that may be
considered when analyzing only state anger.1.3. Altruistic compensation
Third party compensation on the other hand is more likely to be primarily driven
by the latter more narrow altruistic motivation deﬁned by Carlo and colleagues
(2002, 2003) and has been found to be related with empathic concern (Leliveld
et al., 2012). To illustrate this idea of altruistic compensation in contrast to altru-
istic punishment, a short hypothetical example is given. If one thinks about a
man being pushed to the ground, a person with high trait anger will primarily
react with anger towards the aggressor, whereas a person with high trait altruism
will primarily react with empathy for the victim. Altruistic compensation does
not accept a possible harm either for the aggressor or the victim, and therefore
it is in accord with the deﬁnition of altruistically motivated behavior because
the welfare of the persons, even the welfare of the possible aggressor is not en-
dangered (see Carlo et al., 2010, Eisenberg et al., 2007), in contrast to altruistic
punishment.1.4. A narrow deﬁnition of altruism
Following this example, we even suggest to explicitly include this “benevolence” in
a narrow deﬁnition of altruism. Altruism and altruistic acts following our view and
extending the work of Carlo and colleagues (2010), would be an action that is volun-
tary, intended to beneﬁt another person, driven by this motivation to help the other
person to at least 50% (in order to avoid the domination of other motives like public
reputation, see e.g. Carlo and Randall, 2002; Rodrigues et al., 2017) and is benev-
olent, meaning that there is no intention of harming other persons during the process
of helping. This narrow deﬁnition of altruism is an extension of the deﬁnition given
by Carlo and colleagues (2010) and is in contrast to the deﬁnition given by Fehr and
Fischbacher (2003), which only includes the costs of the action and the beneﬁt for
another person. In the case of “altruistic punishment”, this beneﬁt is argued to be
given by the reinforcement of a fairness norm, but we would doubt that the driving
force behind this action is altruism. Instead, we would suggest that trait anger might
play a more important role for “altruistic” or maybe more precisely “costly”
punishment.on.2018.e00962
ors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
censes/by/4.0/).
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Given the empirical evidence and our deﬁnition of altruism mentioned above, we
aimed to examine the prevailing motivation in third party punishment as compared
to third party compensation using individual diﬀerences in trait altruism and trait
anger. Although these two concepts are diﬀerent kinds of traits, for trait anger being
the proneness to experience a basic emotion (Ekman and Cordaro, 2011) and
altruism being a facet of prosocial behavioral tendencies (Carlo and Randall,
2002), they were chosen because of their empirical relation to the behavioral options
altruistic punishment and altruistic compensation. Also, they are both seen as facets
of the big ﬁve personality traits, with anger being the second facet of neuroticism and
altruism being the third facet of agreeableness (Maples et al., 2014). Therefore, these
two yet diﬀerent traits may be comparable concerning their eﬀects on third party par-
adigms. We hypothesized that altruistic punishment would correlate positively with
measures of trait anger and aggression whereas altruistic compensation would corre-
late positively with a measure of trait altruism. To control for the potential inﬂuences
of the behavioral options provided by the paradigm used to study altruism, in this
case providing only the option to punish or only the option to compensate and there-
fore measuring a combination of altruism and anger, we included three diﬀerent
blocks in the experiment, where the observer could only punish, only compensate
or do both.2. Materials and methods
2.1. Ethical statement
The study was carried out in accordance with the recommendations of “Ethical
guidelines, The Association of German Professional Psychologists” (“Berufsethi-
sche Richtlinien, Berufsverband Deutscher Psychologinnen und Psychologen”)
with written informed consent from all subjects. All subjects gave written informed
consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki before they participated in
the experiment. The protocol was not approved by any additional ethics committee,
for the used paradigms are common practice in psychological experiments. Also,
following x7.3.2 of the “Ethical guidelines, The Association of German Professional
Psychologists”, the approval by an ethical committee is optional. As the local ethics
committee is very busy, it does not deal with paradigms that are common practice
and ethically uncritical. The local ethics committee only handles potentially prob-
lematic experiments and as all ethical standards and recommendations were com-
plied, and the study protocol was deemed uncritical concerning ethical
considerations, the study was not submitted to the local ethics committee. Addition-
ally, researchers have the responsibility for conducting their research according to
the human rights and ethical guidelines, independent of being approved by an ethicon.2018.e00962
ors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
censes/by/4.0/).
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the researcher. Accordingly, the study did not receive and does not require an ethical
committee approval according to our institution’s guidelines and national regula-
tions. During the experiment, a cover story was used, but they were told about
this deception as soon as the task was over, as it is common practice in psychological
experiments.2.2. Participants
We a priori estimated the required sample size with G-power software (Faul et al.,
2007). Assuming an average eﬀect of r ¼ .36 of anger on altruistic punishment
(e.g. Lotz et al., 2011a) and a ¼ .05 and power (1-b) ¼ .8 yielded a required sample
size of N ¼ 55. 58 participants participated in this study to account for possible data
loss. Missing data occurred eventually for one person, because the number of the on-
line questionnaires were lost and leading to a ﬁnal sample size of 57 participants (29
females, 28 males, mean age ¼ 23.11, SD age ¼ 6.91, range ¼ 18e52, 4 left
handed). Despite all participants having the illusion that they would get money
from the experiment because of the cover story, most of the participants received
educational credits for their participation, the rest of the participants were paid a
small amount of money (5 Euro) for their participation.2.3. Procedure
Participants were told that they were part of a cooperation based study with other uni-
versities, investigating economic decisions under time pressure. This setting was used
as a cover story andwas not revealed to the participants until the end of the experiment
in order to convince the participants that they were playing with other persons in the
third party economic game. Also, as the other ﬁctive players were from other univer-
sities and not a direct “ingroup”, the cooperationwas not directly reinforced. First they
ﬁlled in a web-based questionnaire, containing several trait questionnaires (see trait
measurement section) and demographical data (e.g. gender, age and handedness).
The online questionnaire was presented with SoSci Survey (Leiner, 2014).
Then the participants came to the lab for the experiment. They were told that three
diﬀerent roles were provided in this study which would be randomly assigned: The
ﬁrst role would be the dictator who has to divide 8 Cents between him- or herself and
a receiver, the second position. The third position would be a spectator of the dicta-
tor’s oﬀer. The player in the third position would be able to interfere with the result-
ing division by investing his or her own money. Unbeknownst to the participants, the
lottery assigning positions was staged so that participants always participated in the
role of the spectator. Because they were the only person actually participating in the
study, the other positions were played by the computer, which was not revealed to
the participants until the end of the experiment.on.2018.e00962
ors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
censes/by/4.0/).
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only able to punish the ﬁctive dictator by spending their money. The participants
were told that for each cent spent, the dictator lost one cent. No additional informa-
tion was given and no additional framing was intended. This is the classical third
party punishment paradigm or altruistic punishment game as used by Fehr and
Fischbacher (2004). In the second block the participants could only compensate
the receiver with their money. For each cent spent the receiver got an additional
cent. No additional information was given and no additional framing was intended.
This is the altruistic compensation game as used by Leliveld et al. (2008). In the third
block the participants could either punish the dictator as in the ﬁrst block or compen-
sate the receiver as in the second block or do both. First they were able to punish the
dictator as in the ﬁrst block followed by the opportunity to compensate the receiver.
At the end of the trial the resulting allocation was shown as in block 1 or block 2. In
this third block the participants were able to spend twice as much as in the ﬁrst and
second block. But the maximum and minimum of the resulting amounts of money
for dictator and receiver always stayed between the same boundaries as in the pre-
vious blocks (for a more detailed example see below) and the ratio between money
spent by the dictator and the money the participant is able to spend in every part of
the task stayed the same. Each of the three blocks consisted of 45 trials and the par-
ticipants were informed of their type of interaction just before the block started. So
they had no knowledge during a block what kind of interaction with the other ﬁctive
players would occur in the next blocks. Also, the participants were not informed at
the beginning of the experiment what kind of interaction exactly would be possible
during the experiment. Hence, the participants had just the information what to do in
the present block. All 45 oﬀers were randomly sampled from the three oﬀers (oﬀer-
ing 0 cent, 2 cent or 4 cent) in the oﬀer range from 0 to 8 cents as explained below,
with each oﬀer being presented 15 times. All trials started with the alleged oﬀer of a
ﬁctive dictator shown for 1.5 seconds depicted as picture of an oﬀer with either 8:0,
6:2 or 4:4 cents and therefore always leaving at least one half of the money for the
ﬁctive dictators. Then participants had the opportunity to spend their money for 5
seconds. This time constraint was imposed because of the cover story and to keep
the experiment time under control, for the free choice time could lead to very
long trials. The amount of money participants were able to spend was identical to
the money kept by the dictator. For example if dictators kept 8 Cents for themselves
a maximum of 8 Cents could be spent. So a participant could use all available money
for punishment and the dictator would get 0 cent. Thus the resulting amount of
money for dictator and receiver were kept between the same boundaries. We only
analyzed the relative amount of money spent, meaning the amount of money that
was spent by the participant, divided by the amount of money that was available
to spent in the respective trial, in order to correct for the diﬀerent reference frames
of the meaning of e.g. 2 Cents when one has 6 Cents to spent vs. 2 Cents to spent.
After making a decision or after 5 seconds had passed the trial continued withon.2018.e00962
ors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
censes/by/4.0/).
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ation cross was shown for 3 seconds, keeping up the cover story of sending and
receiving the data from the other participants before the next trial started. The ﬁrst
two blocks were followed by a break of 15 seconds each.
It was not stated clearly to the participants whether the other (ﬁctive) players would
be the same for the whole game or not, but the setting of the cover story suggested
that they would be playing with the same persons during the whole experiment.2.4. Trait measurement
The questionnaires used in this study were a translated version of the revised version
of the Prosocial Tendencies Measure (PTM-R; Carlo and Randall, 2002; Carlo et al.,
2003, Rodrigues et al., 2017), the German version of Buss e Perry aggression ques-
tionnaire (Buss and Perry, 1992; Herzberg, 2003), the German version of State- trait
e anger e expression e inventory (STAXI; Schwenkmezger and Hodapp, 1991;
Spielberger, 1988) and a German version of the empathic concern scale (Paulus,
2009).
For the PTM-R, the subscale altruism was used to determine altruism on a trait level
(Cronbach’s a¼ .67). This scale consists of 6 items, like the negatively poled item “I
think that one of the best things about helping others is that it makes me look good”.
For the Buss e Perry aggression questionnaire, the subscale anger (Cronbach’s a ¼
.82) was used to determine anger on a trait level, along with the measurement of
STAXI (Cronbach’s a ¼ .77). This scale consisted of 7 items, like the positively
poled item “I sometimes feel like a powder keg ready to explode”.
The two diﬀerent measurements of anger were not averaged, as the STAXI was used
to assess the trait anger explicitly, while the Buss-Perry aggression questionnaire did
not distinguish that clearly between state and trait anger. Therefore the measure-
ments obtained with the Buss-Perry aggression questionnaire were only included
in the exploratory analysis.
For the exploratory analysis, we used the subscales of aggression (measured with
Buss - Perry aggression questionnaire Herzberg, 2003, Cronbach’s a ¼ .89) and
empathy (measured with empathic concern scales Paulus, 2009, Cronbach’s a ¼
.46).2.5. Data analytic approach
We computed four linear regressions with the mean of the relative amount of money
spent in every condition (“punishment only”, “compensation only”, “punishment if
both options are available”, “compensation if both options are available”) as the cri-
terion for each of two predictors: “Trait altruism” (measured with PTM-R; Carloon.2018.e00962
ors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
censes/by/4.0/).
Table 1. Cronbach’s al
Scale PTM-R
altruism
S
t
a
Cronbach’s alpha 0.67
Number of items 6
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1991). Following our hypothesis, we expected trait altruism to predict compensation
and trait anger to predict punishment. Additionally, we made two linear regressions
for the third block of the experiment were both behavioral options were available
with the “trait altruism”/“trait anger” as criterion and the mean relative amount of
money used for “punishment” and “compensation” as predictors.
In addition we exploratory analyzed the correlations between the subscales of
aggression (measured with Buss - Perry aggression questionnaire Herzberg, 2003)
and empathy (measured with empathic concern scales Paulus, 2009) with the amount
of money spent in all conditions.
Statistical analysis was carried out with IBM SPSS version 21.
The data analyzed in this study is provided as supplementary data in order to be
available for meta-analyses or re-analyses.3. Results
The reliability of all questionnaire scales included in the analyses is shown in
Table 1.
The mean relative money spent on compensation and punishment in every block for
every oﬀer of the dictator can be seen in Table 2.
For the regression models with the traits as predictors, only two regression models of
the ﬁrst 4 regression models show a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the predictor and one regres-
sion model shows a marginal eﬀect for the predictor on the behavior. Summaries of
these regression models are shown in Table 3. For “altruism” as a predictor for the
criterion “compensation if both options are available” b¼ .297, t(55)¼2.15, p< .05,
for “anger” as predictor for the criterion “punishment if both options are available” b
¼ .249, t(55)¼1.79, p¼.08 and for “anger” as predictor for the criterion “punishment
only” b ¼ .299, t(55)¼2.16, p < .05 signiﬁcant eﬀects were found. All in all, the
regression analyses showed that if participants have the option to either punish or
compensate, then people scoring high on anger are more likely to punish whereas
high altruists are more likely to compensate.pha for every questionnaire included in the analyses.
TAXI
rait
nger
Buss - Perry
aggression
questionnaire
aggression
Buss - Perry
aggression
questionnaire
anger
Buss - Perry
aggression
questionnaire
physical
aggression
Buss - Perry
aggression
questionnaire
verbal aggression
Buss - Perry
aggression
questionnaire
hostility
SPF
empathic
concern
0.77 0.89 0.82 0.72 0.64 0.77 0.46
10 27 6 8 5 8 4
on.2018.e00962
ors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
censes/by/4.0/).
Table 2. Mean relative and mean absolute money spent for every behavioral
condition of the experiment and for every oﬀer.
Whole
experiment
Offer of
dictator: 0 cent
Offer of
dictator: 2 cent
Offer of
dictator: 4 cent
Mean relative money used
for punishment only
36% 49% 39% 19%
Mean relative money used
for compensation only
29% 41% 33% 13%
Mean realtive money used
for punishment if both
was available
28% 38% 29% 18%
Mean realtive money used
for compensation if both
was available
39% 46% 41% 29%
Mean absolute money used
for punishment only
in cents
2.33 3.89 2.35 0.76
Mean absolute money used
for compensation only
in cents
1.92 3.28 1.97 0.51
Mean absolute money used
for punishment if both
was available in cents
1.84 3.03 1.77 0.71
Mean absolute money used
for compensation if both
was available in cents
2.45 3.70 2.47 1.17
Table 3. Summary of regression models.
Predictor Criterion Signiﬁcant t p b R2
Altruism Punishment only  1.50 .138 .208 .09
Anger Punishment only þ 2.16 .035 .299 .09
Altruism Compensation only  1.56 .124 .221 .05
Anger Compensation only  .89 .377 .126 .05
Altruism Punishment, given
both options
 0.37 .710 .052 .04
Anger Punishment, given
both options
(þ) 1.79 .080 .249 .04
Altruism Compensation, given
both options
þ 2.15 .036 .297 .08
Anger Compensation, given
both options
 0.19 .849 .027 .08
Punishment, given both options Altruism (þ) 1.78 .081 .235 .13
Compensation, given both options Altruism þ 2.68 .01 .352 .13
Punishment, given both options Aanger þ 2.31 .025 .311 .10
Compensation, given both options Anger  1.19 .238 .160 .10
10 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2018.e00962
2405-8440/ 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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compensation with both options available
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Z - transformed STAXI trait anger score
punishment with both options available
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-
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Z - transformed STAXI trait anger score
punishment with only punishment available
r = .289 r = .266 r = .227
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persons showing more compensation in this block had higher altruism scores b ¼
.352, t(54)¼2.68, p < .05. Also, participants that showed more punishment were
marginally signiﬁcantly less altruistic b ¼ .235, t(54)¼1.78, p¼.08 and had
signiﬁcantly higher anger scores b ¼ .311, t(54)¼2.31, p < .05.
The bivariate correlations of the relevant parameters in the signiﬁcant and marginally
signiﬁcant regression models are shown in Fig. 1.
Exploratory analysis revealed signiﬁcant correlations between the mean of the rela-
tive amount of money spent in the diﬀerent conditions as can be seen in Table 4. The
subscales hostility and verbal aggression from Buss e Perry Aggression Question-
naire (Herzberg, 2003) show a marginally signiﬁcant correlation (hostility: r¼ .234,
p ¼ .079, verbal aggression: r ¼ .242, p ¼ .070) with the amount of money spent in
the punishment only condition. Other personality traits than those that were alreadyTable 4. Correlation of money spent in altruistic punishment, money spent in
altruistic compensation, empathic concern scales and Buss e Perry Aggression
Questionnaire with subscales hostility, physical aggression, verbal aggression
and anger.
Punishment
only
Compensation
only
Punishment
given both
options
Compensation
given both
options
Compensation only .624**
Punishment given both options .532** .565**
Compensation given both options .642** .661** .287*
Aggression .197 .033 .079 .098
Hostility .234y .076 .142 .044
Physical aggression .012 .06 .045 .123
Verbal aggression .242y .113 .011 .003
Anger .131 .029 .056 .137
Empathic concern .027 .011 .131 .039
Notes: **: p < .01, *: p < .05, y: p < .1.
on.2018.e00962
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spent on punishment or compensation. Possible income eﬀects, leading to less in-
vestment if one has invested much in prior blocks can be ruled out by the positive
correlation of all behaviors in all blocks.4. Discussion
Besides using helping behavior as well as dictator games, third party dictator games
were also used to account for altruistic behavior (see Fehr and G€achter, 2002). In
these third party dictator games the two major varieties that were used are altruistic
punishment and altruistic compensation. Our study investigated whether altruism is
the driving motivation for altruistic punishment and compensation or whether anger
plays the major role in altruistic punishment.4.1. Trait anger leads to punishment, trait altruism leads to
compensation
We found that given both opportunities to punish and to compensate, the relative
amount of money spent in the task is predicted by trait anger in the case of altruistic
punishment and by trait altruism in the case of altruistic compensation. Thus altruistic
punishment seems to be driven more by trait anger than by trait altruism, if both op-
tions are available. Also, trait altruism does not predict altruistic punishment if both
behavioral options are given.We could also show that this eﬀect is true in general, not
just in the case given both options. We also found an eﬀect of the availability of just
one option vs the two behavioral options. Here, just having the option to punish leads
to more punishment compared to the punishment that is given if both options are
available. Remarkably there was no signiﬁcant interaction of the possibility to punish
or to do both punishment and compensation, with trait anger in predicting the altru-
istic punishment. The opposite pattern can be observed for altruistic compensation,
where trait altruism seems to be the driving force of the shown behavior, also with
an additional eﬀect of the behavioral options, where having both options leads to
more compensation but still there is no signiﬁcant interaction of these two eﬀects.4.2. The importance of having both behavioral options available
and executed
However, as there is a high correlation between the assessed behaviors in the diﬀerent
tasks, there still might be a conglomeration of trait anger and trait altruism driving the
resulting behavior. Therefore it is not possible to get an uncontaminated measure of
one or another if one just uses one behavioral option, either to compensate or to punish
the other players in the third party economic game. But if there are two possible op-
tions, the option to punish the dictator and the possibility to compensate the receiver,on.2018.e00962
ors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
censes/by/4.0/).
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the altruistic punishment are strengthened and the other trait loses inﬂuence on the
behavior. Hence it is important to use a task that combines both paradigms, altruistic
punishment and altruistic compensation instead of using just one behavioral option, if
one is interested in the measurement and inﬂuence of altruism and anger on these eco-
nomic decisions. Leliveld and colleagues (2012) as well as Lotz and colleagues
(2011b) did already make that notion on another behalf, showing that it is important
to give participants the opportunity to choose what kind of behavior they want to
execute. Furthermore they could show the inﬂuence of empathic concern (Leliveld
et al., 2012) and oﬀender focused emotion (Lotz et al., 2011b) on the choice of
compensating or punishing behavior in third party economic games. Our work is
trying to extend these ﬁndings to the motivational level, now showing that the narrow
altruistic motive is not linked to the punishing behavior.4.3. Implications of the ﬁndings for society
Therefore, the altruistic consequences of the punishment behavior might not be the
primary concern of the actor, but just the mere thought of retribution or reinforcement
of social norms (see Leliveld et al., 2012, Lotz et al., 2011a). As long as the punish-
ment stays in between boundaries of adequacy, this may be a good way to strengthen
the social norms in a society, but this kind of behaviormight actually damage a society
if one punishes to hard. Furthermore, the immediate problem of the receiver, in this
case having less or no money at all, is not targeted by this kind of behavior, so the
decline of the welfare of this person is accepted and a purely altruistic motive is there-
fore unlikely. The act of compensation on the other hand is linked to altruistic moti-
vation, targeting the welfare of the receiver right away, but ignoring a possible
perseverance of unfair behavior in the society. Thus altruistic compensation, besides
being linked to altruistic motivation and closely related to the deﬁnition of altruism
(e.g. by Eisenberg et al., 2007), just leads to a short sided welfare eﬀect for the person
supposedly in need, but does not have the intend to change the behavior or even harm
or punish defectors of social norms and the society.4.4. Trait anger and trait altruism in the third party economic
game with both behavioral options
In this study, we used trait altruism and trait anger as predictors for punishment behavior
aswell as for altruistic compensation.One reason to do sowas to account for theproblem
of unexplained variance that may occur if one is only dealingwith induced states in such
a paradigm (see e.g. Steyer et al., 1999). Traits like anger and altruismmay act as a heu-
ristic for reactions in people (e.g. Veenstra et al., 2017, 2018; Rodrigues et al., 2015).
Hence traits may in some cases overshadow statemanipulations that are given and there-
fore lead to systematic error variance, if only the states are considered as relevant.on.2018.e00962
ors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
censes/by/4.0/).
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tigate the reaction patterns related to relevant traits if diﬀerent behavioral options are
given. As trait anger was always related to punishment behavior, the behavioral options
do not seem to have an impact on people with high trait anger. They will likely try to
punish defectors, even if they have the additional chance to help the victims of the def-
ection. This kind of behavior is not to be seen as a bad thing per se, as long as the pun-
ishment stays in appropriate boundaries. Some advantages and disadvantages of the
punishment behavior and altruistic compensation for the individual and the society
have been shortly mentioned above, and the purely altruistic act of compensation is
not likely to cause a change in the behavior of the defector and his impact on society.
If only the option to compensate is present, there is no speciﬁc reaction pattern for
high or low trait anger. Hence they will just help as everyone else would do with no spe-
ciﬁc deviation from it. Trait altruism however only shows a clear inﬂuence if one is able
to help the victim and to punish the defector. A speciﬁc negative relation to punishment
was present and a positive relation on helping the victimwas found.But if punishment or
compensation was the only behavioral option, no speciﬁc relation was found. Therefore
high trait altruism people as well as low altruism people will also go for the punishment
like everyone else, if they don’t have any other option to react. Theseﬁndings lead to the
assumption, that if one only provides the behavioral option of helping, everyone may
choose this option, independent of their trait disposition, as long as a motivation to
show any reaction is present. For punishing behavior on the other hand, trait anger seems
to always play an important role. This leads to simple practical implications concerning
behavioral options and confounds of traitmotivation that could beused in our society.As
long as one is only providing benevolent behavioral options, everyonemay choose them
in order to satisfy their urge to react according to their traits. But as soon as some other
options are available, the traits will take their inﬂuence in choosing relevant behavioral
options like punishment in the case of trait anger. Therefore every association, society or
movement should consider whether they want to engage in purely benevolent actions
like for example cleaning the shores in order to get everyone involved in these actions,
or whether they want to provide also more punishment prone activities like for example
blockading or even attacking an oil platform, which would automatically lead to a divi-
sion of their members, likely based on traits and motivations like anger and altruism.
Also, calling destructive and aggressive acts altruistic may not be the right labeling,
for they are most likely driven by anger or trait anger and should therefore not be called
altruistic.4.5. Limitations
One limitation of the present work is the confounding of the diﬀerent options of
interaction with the order in the diﬀerent blocks. As the participants experienced
the two blocks with the options of punishment and compensation ﬁrst, before they
learned about their more complex task to do both, they all experiences the optionon.2018.e00962
ors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
censes/by/4.0/).
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order was chosen to make sure that the participants are able to deal with the more
complex task on one hand, on the other hand, that they do not feel bored in the blocks
after the complex task with the simpler ones. Also in order to not work against the
impulsive component of anger, the order of the block during the paradigm was cho-
sen with the punishment always being the ﬁrst option in block three or being the ﬁrst
behavior to execute in the paradigm in block one.
A second limitation is the time constraint that was implemented for the decision of the
participants. This may have an inﬂuence on the amount of punishment and compensa-
tion that is shown by the participants. Rand (2016) argues that more intuitive driven
paradigms, as operationalized with the time constraint in our paradigm, lead to more
cooperation. Also, Rand and colleagues (Rand et al., 2016) found that this eﬀect of
intuition driven paradigms is true for women, but not for men. However Capraro
andCococcioni (2016) showed that a strong time constraintmay also lead to decreased
cooperation via ego-depletion. But these ﬁnding do not lead to a clear prediction of the
bias in the present paradigm, because no third party economic game was included in
both studies. One may only guess that the altruistic compensation might be higher un-
der time pressure, for it is more similar to the cooperation behavior that was assessed in
the meta-analysis by Rand (2016) than altruistic punishment. However Sutter et al.
(2003) could show that a tight time constraint leads to more rejection and therefore
altruistic punishment in the ultimatum game, although the eﬀect vanishes with repeti-
tion. Therefore, we could also expect an initial higher altruistic punishment in third
party games under the time constraint that is implemented here as we would expect
without it. But as the bias should inﬂuence both altruistic punishment and altruistic
compensation in the same manner (see above except Capraro and Cococcioni,
2016), the time constraint should not add systematic error variance to the ﬁndings.
Another limitation of the present study is the sample size. However, as the power of
the study was estimated, we are conﬁdent, that this work might contribute to the ﬁeld
none the less. Also, the reliability of some scales involved in this study was rather
low (see Table 1) and this may inﬂuence also the reliability of the conclusions drawn
from the data.5. Conclusion
Importantly recent studies using compensate only or punishment only paradigms
have systematically confounded the motives of trait altruism and trait anger. Our ﬁnd-
ings are in line with previous results suggesting a strong relation between anger and
altruistic punishment (see Fehr andG€achter, 2002; Nelissen and Zeelenberg, 2009). If
given the choice, high trait altruists seem to prefer compensation, which is perfectly
well in line with the narrower view and deﬁnition of altruism being revealed by aon.2018.e00962
ors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
censes/by/4.0/).
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persons. Accordingly, our results corroborate the view that diﬀerent kinds of motives
and traits may be hidden behind third party punishment behavior and that altruistic
punishment is not related to altruism, if an option of compensation is available.Declarations
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